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I.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
A. Did the Trial court err in awarding Page Electric pre-judgment interest despite
Glendon's tender of payment?
Standard of Review: The propriety of pre-judgment interest is a question of law
which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to
the trial court's conclusion. Hermes Associates v. Park's Sportsman. 813 P.2d 1221,
1223 (Utah App. 1991).
B.

Was there a written contract between Page Electric and Glendon?

Standard of Review: Whether a contract exists between parties is a question of
law which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference
to the trial court's conclusion. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583
(Utah App. 1992).
C.
Was the contract between Page Electric and Glendon ambiguous?
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Standard of Review: Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which
an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial
court's conclusion. Lyngle v. Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah App. 1992); West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 1991); Winegar v. Froerer
Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands 802 P.2d
720 (Utah 1990); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d
581, 582 (Utah App. 1990); Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964
(Utah App. 1988).
D. Did the Trial court err in failing to reduce the judgment by the amount of
liquidated damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric?
Standard of Review: The propriety of Liquidated damages is a question of law
which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to
the trial court's conclusion. Kvassay v. Murray. 808 P.2d 896, 898 & 900, 15 Kan.
App. 2d 426 (1991).
E. Did the Trial court err in denying defendant's Motion to Amend Findings and
Judgment or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial because the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to support the amount of the judgment?
Standard of Review: Is the evidence insufficient to support the amount of
judgment? Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

3

F.

Did the Trial court err in awarding Page Electric $338.47 per building to

replace damaged or defective lights at the Murray and Orem Autozones?
Standard of Review: An appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual
findings unless they are against the clear weight of evidence or the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. A finding
is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an
erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990).
G. Did the Trial court err in refusing to allow closing argument at trial?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion affecting a party's substantial rights.
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990).
H. Did the Trial court err in disregarding defendant's request for oral argument
on its post-trial motion?
Standard of Review: Same as stated in issues A - D above.
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m.
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953). The foregoing statute is set forth
verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum A.
B. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(b),(c) & (d). The
foregoing rule is set forth verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum B.
C. Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989). The foregoing statute is set forth
verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum C.

rv.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

This case involves a contract dispute between GLENDON CORPORATION
("Glendon"), a General construction contractor, and PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
("Page Electric") its subcontractor. Page Electric sued Glendon's surety, THE OHIO
CASUALTY GROUP OF INSURANCE COMPANIES ("Ohio Casualty"), on a payment
bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989).
Page Electric's complaint against Ohio casualty, served October 9, 1991, claimed
amounts owing by Glendon for labor and materials provided in the construction of three
Autozone automotive retail stores located in Davis County ("Bountiful Autozone"), Salt
5

Lake County ("Murray Autozone"), and Utah County ("Orem Autozone"). Page
Electric's claims totalled $33,050.52 plus interest, costs and attorney fees. (Record on
Appeal, hereinafter "R.", 1-4).
On December 31, 1991, Ohio Casualty made a formal offer of judgment to Page
Electric in the amount of $22,243.53. (R. 11). Ohio Casualty increased its formal offer
of judgment to $25,000.00 on May 26, 1992. (R. 23). Page Electric rejected both
offers.
The case was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page on June 8 and 10, 1992.
(R. 60, 61). After Page Electric presented its case in chief, Ohio Casualty moved to
dismiss based on Page Electric's failure to comply with the notice requirement of Utah
Code Ann. Section 14-2-5 (1989). (Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter "Tr.", 135-146).
The trial court denied the motion, specifically finding that Page Electric was in privity
of contract with Glendon, therefore, the notice requirement did not apply. (Tr. 144-146).
The court awarded Page Electric judgment in the amount of $25,935.04 plus
prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees. The Judgment, and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were entered August 6, 1992. (R. 66-74). A copy of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Addendum D.
Ohio Casualty moved to amend the findings and judgment or in the alternative,
for a new trial on August 14, 1992. (R. 75-76). The court issued a ruling denying the
motion on January 18, 1993 (R. 101-102) and entered an order on the ruling February
6

3, 1993. (R. 105-106). Ohio Casualty filed its Notice of Appeal on March 4, 1993. (R.
108-109).
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Glendon's Subcontracts with Page Electric

On May 7, 1990, Glendon contracted with AUTOZONE INCORPORATED
("Autozone") to build the Murray, Orem and Bountiful Autozones. (Defendant's Exhibit,
hereinafter "DEx." 17, 18 and 19). Glendon solicited bids from subcontractors for most
of the work on the Autozones, including a bid from Page Electric to install the electrical
hardware at each store. (Tr. 150). Before submitting a bid, Merlin Page, an owner of
Page Electric (Tr. 74), completed and signed a subcontractor pre-qualification form that
contained the following language at paragraph 4 (d):
The acceptance by Glendon Corporation for [sic] this
quotation shall create a binding and enforceable contract of
sale, dating from the time of said acceptance, without any
further action by either party and even though a written
purchase order has not been furnished to or received by the
successful bidder. Said created contract of sale shall
include all of the provisions and specifications of the
request for quotation, offer, acceptance and purchase order
relating thereto. . . .
(DEx. 21, Tr. 164-165).

A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 21 is attached hereto as

Addendum E.
After receiving Glendon's request to bid, Merlin Page visited Glendon's office
and reviewed the plans and specifications for the Autozones. (Tr. 152-154, DEx. 15 and
7

16.) The Murray and Orem Autozones are block buildings, 8100 square feet in size, and
identified as an 8100 super store. The Bountiful Autozone is a metal building, 5400
square feet in size, and identified as a 5400 store. (Tr. 70, 153).
Page Electric submitted its bid to Glendon by letter dated April 16, 1990.
(Plaintiff s Exhibit, hereinafter "PEx." 1, Tr. 11-14). Glendon accepted Page Electric's
bid and requested additional information necessary to prepare formal subcontracts. (PEx.
4 and 5, Tr. 14-15).
On August 16, 1990, Glendon held a preconstruction meeting for the Autozone
projects at its office. Kevin Page represented Page Electric at the meeting. Steve Lefler,
supervisor of the Autozone projects for Glendon, conducted the meeting. (Tr. 185).
Lefler explained the strict time schedules for construction of the Autozones (DEx. 1, Tr.
159, 161, 95), that change orders had to be approved (Tr. 80, 84, 85, 83-94, 192-193),
and various other aspects of the Autozones' construction. (DEx. 1, Tr. 158-163, 186188).

Either prior to, or during the meeting, Glendon presented three written

subcontracts to Page Electric, one for each store. (Tr. 67, 163). The contracts were
identical except for the names of the Autozones. (Tr. 67). Page Electric was instructed
to sign the subcontracts but failed to do so. (DEx. 11, Tr. 161, 68, 187). Nevertheless,
Page Electric proceeded with the electrical work on the Autozones.
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The subcontracts incorporated the prime contracts, plans and specifications, and
job schedules. (DEx. 11, Tr. 272). Glendon made these documents available for review
by all subcontractors. (Tr. 268-269, 271, 162, 99, 67, 71-72).
2.

Liquidated Damages and Additional Damages

The plans and specifications (DEx. 15, 16) and prime contracts (DEx. 17, 18, 19)
contained a uniform liquidated damages provision of $300.00 per day for late completion
and a bonus provision of $200.00 per day for early completion. Paragraph 2 of the
subcontracts stated:
The subcontractor agrees to reimburse the contractor for
any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against
and collected from the contractor by the owner, which are
attributable or caused by the subcontractor's failure to
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this
contract within the time fixed in the manner provided for
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the
contractor such other additional damages as contractor may
sustain by reason of such delay by the subcontractor . . . .
(DEx. 11). A copy of the subcontract is attached hereto as Addendum F.
The plans and specifications required Glendon to substantially complete the
Bountiful Autozone in 65 calendar days and the Murray and Orem Autozones in 80
calendar days. (DEx. 15, 16). These demanding schedules prompted Glendon to
implement a critical path method of scheduling subcontract work. Glendon used a
computer to calculate and track the number of days a subcontractor was on the critical
path and to direct the course of construction so Glendon would meet its completion
9

deadlines. (Tr. 282). Glendon also input information about change orders into the
computer. (Tr. 283).
Glendon completed the Bountiful Autozone on schedule but failed to meet the
completion deadlines for the Murray and Orem Autozones. Glendon's actual completion
date on the Murray Autozone exceeded the contract completion date by 20 days. (DEx.
7, 9). Autozone assessed liquidated damages of $300.00 per day or a total of $6,000.00
pursuant to the terms of the prime contract. (DEx. 7, 8). Glendon in turn assessed its
subcontractors for actual delay to the critical path schedules pursuant to the
reimbursement clause in its subcontracts. Page Electric was not assessed damages on the
Orem Autozone because it did not delay the critical path schedule but was assessed the
sum of $1,263.16 as its pro rata share of damages on the Murray Autozone. (DEx. 9,
Tr. 221-222, 248-250, 212-214). Copies of Defendant's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 are attached
hereto as Addendum G.
3.

Page Electric's Extra Charges for Replacing Damaged or Defective
Ballasts

Autozone supplied electrical hardware for the Autozone stores directly to Page
Electric through its supplier, TEC of Jonesboro, Arkansas. On November 6, 1990 TEC
shipped ballasts to Page Electric to replace damaged or defective ballasts that had been
previously supplied. (DEx. 20). Steve Lefler sent a memorandum to Page Electric on
January 16, 1991 explaining that Autozone was charging Glendon $338.47 per building
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on the Murray and Orem Autozones because defective or damaged ballasts were never
returned to TEC. (PEx. 14). A copy of Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 is attached hereto as
Addendum H. The same day, Glendon prepared negative change orders to reduce the
amount of Page Electric's contract on each store by $338.47. (DEx. 25a).
Page Electric returned the damaged or defective ballasts to TEC on January 23,
1991 (DEx. 20) and responded to Glendon's memorandum the same day. (PEx. 14).
TEC reimbursed Page Electric's shipping costs by check dated January 29, 1991. (DEx.
20). Autozone never reimbursed Glendon for the $338.47 it deducted from both prime
contracts. (Tr. 210, 223-224, 242-243, 256-258).
Kelly Page testified at trial that Page Electric charged Glendon $338.47 extra on
the Murray and Orem Autozones to change the ballasts. (Tr. 107-109). He admitted
that Page Electric did not test the ballasts before installing them in the fixtures. (Tr.
110). Kevin Page testified that he met with representatives of Glendon who claimed
negative change orders of $338.47 on the Murray and Orem contracts for Page Electric's
failure to return damaged or defective ballasts. Kevin produced records (DEx. 20)
proving that the ballasts had been returned. He then recorded positive change orders for
the Murray and Orem stores to offset Glendon's negative change orders and incorporated
this information into his July 1991 billing statement to Glendon. The statement, however,
failed to account for Glendon's negative change orders. (Tr. 82-83, PEx. 10).
4.

Glendon's Tender of Payment to Page Electric
11

On November 21, 1990, Glendon sent check number 6388 to Page Electric in the
amount of $297.00 to pay for installation of the temporary electrical hook-up on the
Murray Autozone. The reverse of the check contained the following endorsement
provision:
By endorsement hereon, the payee acknowledges receipt of
the amount of this check in full payment and satisfaction
for all work performed and/or materials furnished on the
premises as described on the face hereof to date shown
below, and waives all rights to mechanic's and/or
materialman's lien therefor. Must be endorsed by the
payee in person, or if a corporation, must be signed by an
officer giving his title.
Date
(DEx. 2).
Jeanene S. Page, president of Page Electric (Tr. 74), endorsed the reverse of the
check and inserted the date of December 20, 1990. She also wrote, "payment in full on
invoice number 3095". Page Electric negotiated the check. (DEx. 2, 26).
On December 10th, 12th and 20th, 1990 Glendon sent checks numbered 6538,
6560 and 6598 totalling $18,067.80 to Page Electric. Glendon's tender exceeded the
total amount payable to Page Electric at that time under the terms of the parties'
subcontracts. (PEx, 9, DEx 11). The reverse of these three checks contained the same
endorsement provision as check number 6388. Page Electric refused Glendon's tender
by returning the three checks, certified mail, on or about February 6, 1991. Included
in the envelope was a hand-written note that read:
12

6-5-91 I've been advised to refuse the enclosed checks
because with this stamp, you cannot pay partially-we will
accept payment in full as invoiced only. NOW! Jeanene S.
Page, Page Electric.
(DEx. 2, Tr. 273-281, 284-287, PEx. 9). (Emphasis in original).
5.

Rulings by the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that there was no written agreement between Page Electric
and Glendon. (Tr. 323). There was, however, an oral contract evidenced by certain
writings. The court specifically stated that these written contract documents included the
construction plans and site plans, and inferred that the prime contract, subcontract, and
addenda were also included. (Tr. 322, 323).
The court ruled that Glendon and Page Electric contemplated there would be
change orders during the course of construction. (Tr. 322, 323-324). The procedure for
submitting change orders was ambiguous and neither Glendon nor Page Electric complied
with the change order procedures described in the subcontract. (Tr. 323, 324). Most of
Page Electric's change orders were for work that was contemplated in the original
agreement (but somehow overlooked by Page Electric). (Tr. 324). However, it was
uncontroverted at trial that the parking lights at the Murray Autozone and the additional
Rooftop HVAC units for the Murray and Orem Autozones were appropriate change
orders. (Tr. 325, 328).
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According to the trial Court, the parties' agreement contemplated progress
payments to Page Electric as Glendon received progress payments from Autozone. (Tr.
323). The checks tendered to Page Electric contained a release of lien on all sums due
and owing to a certain date which justified Page Electric's rejection of the tender. (Tr.
328).
The court ruled that Page Electric was given notice of the liquidated damages
provisions in the contract documents, however, "in light of the extras that were charged
relative to the Murray store, there is no indication that the extra days were in fact used
in doing those extras or in some other way, and therefore the court denies any liquidated
damages apportioned to these plaintiffs in this particular case." (Tr. 326-327).
The court ruled that Page Electric was entitled to the extra sum of $338.47 for
replacing defective lighting ballasts at the Murray Autozone. The court's findings applied
the extra $338.47 to both the Orem and Murray contracts. The judge reasoned that
Glendon was advised Page Electric returned the defective equipment in January 1991 but
did not seek reimbursement even though Glendon's dealings with Autozone did not end
until April 1991. (Tr. 325, 326).
At trial, Ohio Casualty's counsel questioned Glendon's supervisor, Steve Lefler,
about the nature and amounts of the various change orders on the Autozones. At the end
of his questioning, counsel said to the trial judge, "your Honor would you like me to take
the time to do the addition now or would you like to do it?" The judge responded, "you
14

can do it later when you make your [closing] argument." (Tr. 227). Later, the court
required counsel to forego closing arguments. (Tr. 321).
Ohio Casualty requested oral argument on its Motion to Amend Findings and
Judgment or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial filed August 14, 1992. (R. 75-76, 8586). The trial court disregarded, without explanation, Ohio Casualty's request and issued
its ruling denying the motion on January 18, 1993. (R. 101-102). A copy of the trial
court's ruling is attached hereto as Addendum I.
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a tender rejected by an obligee

stops the running of interest. In December 1990, Glendon tendered three checks to Page
Electric that were later rejected. The trial court should not have awarded prejudgment
interest at least, on the amount of the three checks.
The endorsement provision on the reverse of the three checks does not justify
rejection of Glendon's tender because Page Electric could have qualified its endorsement
as it did on another Glendon check. Page Electric waived any objection it had to
Glendon's tender by failing to comply with Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-3 (1953).
Page Electric sued Ohio Casualty on payment bonds limited to "a sum equal to
the contract price". The award of prejudgment interest causes the judgment to exceed
the amounts of the payment bonds.
15

B.

The contract between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and not

ambiguous. The parties' failure to comply with the change order provisions in the
subcontract did not make the contract ambiguous.
C.

Since the agreement between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and

not ambiguous, the trial court should have strictly applied the liquidated damages clause
in the subcontract. Glendon assessed damages to subcontractors based solely on their pro
rata share of actual delay to the critical path schedule. No evidence was presented at
trial that Page Electric was assessed liquidated damages for time spent working on
change orders.
D.

The trial court's award of $338.47 per building on the Murray and Orem

Autozones for replacing damages or defective lighting was erroneous and not supported
by sufficient evidence as a matter of law.

The amounts awarded ($338.47) were

originally charges by Glendon to Page Electric for failure to return damaged or defective
lighting to Autozone's supplier TEC. When the lighting was later returned the amounts
deducted should have been added to Page Electric's contract thus creating a "wash"
transaction. Instead, Page Electric added these amounts to its contract but made no
corresponding reduction which inappropriately increased the amount of Page Electric's
contract. These amounts were added to Page Electric's July 1991 billing statement and
incorrectly designated as an installation charge.

16

The trial courts denial of Glendon's liquidated damages assessment to Page
Electric was also erroneous and not supported by sufficient evidence.
E.

The trial court failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (3)(b)(c) and (d) of the

Utah Code of Judicial Administration in disregarding Ohio Casualty's request for oral
argument on its post-trial motion. The need for oral argument was underscored by the
trial court's nonresponsive and partially irrelevant ruling of January 18, 1993.
VI.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
ON THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT

The trial court awarded Page Electric prejudgment interest at the legal rate from
January 23, 1991 (the date Page Electric returned the damaged or defective ballasts to
TEC) to the date of judgment. (R. 73). In Utah County v. Brown, Justice Hall wrote,
"[a]n appeal does not stop the running of interest. To obtain such a result, the obligor
must make a tender that is rejected by the obligee." 672 P.2d 83, 87 n.9 (Utah 1983),
citing Woodmont. Inc. v. Daniel. 290 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1961).
In December 1990, Glendon tendered three checks to Page Electric, totalling
$18,067.80, which exceeded the total amount payable to Page Electric at that time. Page
Electric rejected Glendon's tender by returning the uncashed checks on or about February
6, 1991.
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Under Utah law, prejudgment interest represents an amount
awarded as damages due to the defendant's delay in
tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or
other obligation.
Baker v. Data Phase. Inc.. 781 F. Supp. 724, 731 (D. Utah 1992) (emphasis added),
citing L & A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980);
Vasels v. Loguidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In the instant case,
Glendon did not delay tendering all amounts then due Page Electric. Accordingly, the
trial court should not have awarded prejudgment interest on $18,067.80 of the total
judgment.
The trial court found that the endorsement provision on the reverse of three
checks Glendon tendered to Page Electric justified rejection of the tender. Curiously,
the court overlooked the fact that Jeanene S. Page endorsed and negotiated check number
6388 dated November 21, 1990 which contained an identical provision.

She even

inserted a date above the endorsement and indicated full payment on invoice number
3095. She could have qualified her endorsement on the other three checks as well. Page
Electric's acceptance of partial payment through check number 6388 is inconsistent with
the reasons given by Page Electric for rejection of Glendon's subsequent tenders.
In its ruling, the trial court said "that Glendon Corporation made no effort to
contact the plaintiffs from the plaintiffs statement, although there is a conflict in
testimony, and to work out those payments and the release of lien provisions." (Tr. 328-
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329). Contrary to Utah law, the trial judge placed the burden of resolving the dispute
over tender of payment squarely on Glendon. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953)
states:
The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time,
specify any objection he may have to the money,
instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived it;
and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the terms
of the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he
must specify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires,
or be precluded from objection afterwards.
Page Electric did not specify any objection it had to Glendon's tender at the time
it was made, in fact, nearly two months elapsed before the uncashed checks were
returned with a note containing a dubious explanation. Thus, Page Electric waived any
objection it had to Glendon's tender. See First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell.
659 P.2d 1078, 1081-1082 (Utah 1983); Hansen v. Christenson. 545 P.2d 1152, 1154
(Utah 1976); Ulibarri v. Christensen. 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, 172 (1954).
In Nielson v. O'Reilly. 200 Ut. Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1992) the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for prejudgment interest in a
first party insurance dispute over uninsured motorist coverage. Chief Justice Hall,
writing for the court, noted that the plaintiff did not pursue a breach of contract claim
against his insurance company. Rather, the proceedings were limited to establishing
coverage under the policy.

19

In the instant case, Page Electric did not sue Ohio Casualty for breach of contract,
but to recover under payment bonds issued in accordance with Utah Code Annotated
Section 14-2-1 (1989). Paragraph 3 states:
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all
persons supplying labor, services, equipment or material
in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract
in a sum equal to the contract price.
(Emphasis added). Since the payment bonds in this case do not exceed the "contract
price", Page Electric should not be allowed to recover additional sums as prejudgment
interest.
In his ruling, the trial judge said," [t]he Court finds that recovery in these kinds
of cases is limited to the contract amount...." (Tr. 329). He knew this is an action to
recover on payment bonds, yet he awarded prejudgment interest anyway.

The award

of prejudgment interest contradicts his finding that recovery is limited to the contract
amount.
B.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GLENDON AND PAGE ELECTRIC
WAS IN WRITING AND NOT AMBIGUOUS

The trial judge's ruling that "there was never any written agreement between the
plaintiffs and Glendon Corporation" (Tr. 323) was contrary to the evidence presented at
trial. The subcontractor pre-qualification form was signed by Merlin Page, an owner of
Page Electric. (DEx. 21). The pre-qualification form stated that Glendon's acceptance
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of Page Electric's bid created a binding and enforceable contract of sale that included all
of the provisions and specifications of the request for quotation, offer, acceptance (plans
and specifications and site plans) and purchase order (subcontract). Thus, defendant's
Exhibit 21 is a written contract executed by the party to be bound.
The trial judge did acknowledge that the parties' agreement was evidenced by
certain written documents and that the parties' relationship was governed by those
documents. (Tr. 322, 323).
If the contract is in writing and the language is not
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined
from the words of the agreement.
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis
Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Oberhansly v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386
(Utah 1977).
The trial court's ruling only mentioned one ambiguity in the contract. The court
said the agreement was unclear about how change orders would occur. (Tr. 324).
Instead of analyzing the contract and explaining why he thought it was ambiguous, the
trial judge directed his attention to the parties, failures to use written change orders.
Paragraph 6 of the subcontract (DEx. 11) explains the procedures for changes to the
subcontract, and although not a model of clarity it is by no means ambiguous.
Admittedly, Glendon and Page Electric did not comply with the requirements of
subcontract paragraph 6, however, their failure to comply does not mean that the contract
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was ambiguous. One could view the conduct of Page Electric and Glendon as simply a
waiver of the written amendment component of paragraph 6.
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an agreement,
the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It
should be looked at ii* its entirety and in accordance with
its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect insofar
as that is possible.
Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)). "Language in a written document is ambiguous if the words used
may be understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Jarman v. Reagan
Outdoor Advertising. 749 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Whitehouse v.
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 61, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The words in paragraph 6 do
not support two or more plausible meanings.
'The cardinal rule [of contract interpretation] is to give effect to the intentions of
the parties, and if possible, to glean those intentions from the contract itself.' Home
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.. 817 P.2d 341, 366-67 (Utah App. 1991). (citations
omitted) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bench). 'In interpreting a contract, we determine
what the parties intended by examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation
to each other, giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.'
Id. (citations and emphasis omitted).

"Courts may not view a subparagraph of a[n]
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[insurance] policy in isolation to determine if it is ambiguous; all provisions of a policy
must be interpreted together as one contract. Id. (citations omitted).
C.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE STRICTLY APPLIED THE
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN THE SUBCONTRACT

Although the trial court believed that the change order provision of the
subcontract between Glendon and Page Electric was unclear, no such claim was made
about the liquidated damages provision. The prime contracts, plans and specifications,
and subcontracts all contained liquidated damages provisions. The trial court found that
Page Electric was given notice that liquidated damages would be imposed for delay to
the job schedule.
Since the agreement between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and not
ambiguous, the court should have strictly applied the liquidated damages provision and
reduced the judgment accordingly. Instead, the court disallowed all liquidated damages
assessed to Page Electric because, (1) the testimony at trial was uncontroverted that there
were change orders on the Murray Au^ozone; and (2) the court could not discern whether
Page Electric's delay resulted from work on change orders or work on the original
contract.
The trial court failed to consider that Glendon used the critical path method of
scheduling the Autozone projects. Glendon also maintained current information about
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change orders. It assessed liquidated damages to subcontractors based solely on their pro
rata share of actual delay to the critical path schedule. (DEx. 9).
A change order would have caused a corresponding extension of time to complete
the project and would not have delayed the critical path schedule unless the work was on
the critical path, and the subcontractor delayed completion of the change order beyond
the extension. The notices of commencement attached to the prime contracts (DEx. 17,
18, 19) are dated June 30, 1990 for the Bountiful Autozone and July 28, 1990 for the
Murray Autozone. The completion dates were October 29, 1990 for Bountiful and
December 3, 1990 for Murray. (Tr. 323). Autozone gave Glendon more than 65 calendar
days on Bountiful and more than 80 calendar days on Murray before it began assessing
liquidated damages.
There were 20 delay days for which liquidated damages were assessed on the
Murray Autozone. Yet, the period of July 28 to December 3 exceeds 100 calendar days.
Autozone gave Glendon additional time to complete approved changes to the job
schedule.
The testimony of Steve Lefler (Tr. 248, 221-222) and defendant's Exhibit 9 show
that Page Electric was scheduled on the critical path of the Murray Autozone project for
9 days. Page Electric actually spent 21 days performing work that was on the critical
path. There was no evidence presented at trial to support the trial judge's belief that one
or more of the 21 days may have been spent working on change orders.
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Where the parties have made an express contract, the court
should not find a different one by 'implication concerning
the same subject matter if the evidence does not justify
[such] an inference . . ..'
Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1988)
(quoting, 3 Corbin on Contracts section 564 (I960)). "A court may not make a better
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may
not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself." IcL
In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989),
Regional sued Reichert for breach of a non-competition clause in Reichert's employment
contract. The contract also contained a liquidated damages provision for breach of the
non-competition clause. Reichert breached the non-competition clause but the jury only
awarded Regional a nominal sum. On appeal, Regional challenged the trial court's jury
instruction on liquidated damages which required Regional to prove that the liquidated
damages provision was fair compensation for the breach and based on a reasonable
relationship to actual damages. The Court of Appeals quoted the following "general
rule" propounded in Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United Standard West. Inc.. 755 P.2d 162
(Utah 1988):
[A]s a general rule, parties to a contract may agree to
liquidated damages in the case of a breach, and such
agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated
damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible
compensatory damages and does not constitute a forfeiture
or a penalty. Reasonable liquidated damage provisions
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may reduce the cost of litigation by obviating the expense
entailed in proving actual damages. If a liquidated
damages provision is enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove
actual damages. The burden is on the party who would
avoid a liquidated damages provision to prove that no
damages were suffered or that there is no reasonable
relationship between compensatory and liquidated damages.
In the instant case, ample evidence was presented at trial that Glendon was
assessed liquidated damages by Autozone on the Murray store in the amount of
$6,000.00. (DEx. 7, 8). Further, defendant's Exhibit 9 shows additional damages to
Glendon in the amount of $4,000.00. Page Electric produced no evidence at trial that
Glendon's damages were less, or that there was no reasonable relationship between
compensatory and liquidated damages. Neither Page Electric nor the trial court claimed
the amount of liquidated damages was a forfeiture or penalty.
All other subcontractors on the Murray Autozone who delayed the critical path
schedule were assessed their pro rata share of liquidated damages and additional
damages. There was no evidence presented at trial that Glendon assessed Page Electric
liquidated damages for performing work necessitated by change orders. However, even
if part of the liquidated damages assessment was applied for delay caused by change
orders, Page Electric would be entitled, at most, to a reduction of the liquidated damages
assessment not the elimination of all liquidated damages.
It is proper for a prime contractor to "pass on" to a
subcontractor liquidated damages caused by the
subcontractor.
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Taos Const. Co. v. Penzel Const. Co.. 750 S.W. 2d 522, 527 (Mo. App. 1988).
In Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990), a framing contractor
foreclosed on a mechanic's lien it had filed against homeowners who counterclaimed
disputing certain "extra" items or change orders and filed a third party complaint against
the general contractor. The framing contractor claimed an unpaid balance of $2,500.00
on the original framing contract of $6,000.00 plus an additional $1,410.00 for change
orders. Many of the change orders requested by the homeowners were necessary to
bring the residence into conformance with the specifications. The homeowners had given
the specifications to the general contractor who failed to transmit them to the framing
contractor.
The trial court ordered the homeowners to pay the framing subcontractor
$1,009.00 for change orders and the $2,500.00 balance on the original contract less an
offset of $516.00 expended by the homeowners to complete the framing. The court
ordered the general contractor to indemnify the homeowners for the full amount of the
judgment. Furthermore, the trial court ordered the general contractor to pay that portion
of the change orders not paid for by the homeowner.
The contract between the homeowners and general contractor contained the
following language, "no changes shall be made to the plans and specifications or the
purchase price except as agreed to in a written change order signed by buyer and
contractor which sets forth the change to be made in an amount of adjustment in the
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purchase price required by said change." It was undisputed at trial that the parties signed
no written change orders.
Hoth is distinguishable because no change orders were caused by the
incompetence of Glendon. Glendon gave Page Electric notice of, and access to, the
plans and specifications, site plans, prime contract, subcontract, and in short, all
information necessary to complete the electrical work on the Autozones. Significantly,
the trial court in Hoth focused on the parties' written and unambiguous contract and
strictly applied its provisions in requiring the general contractor to pay for change orders.
Likewise, in the instant case, the trial court should have strictly applied the liquidated
damages provision contained in the contract documents.
D.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW TO SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

The trial court awarded Page Electric $338.47 on the Murray and Orem
Autozones, or a total of $676.94, to repair damaged or defective lighting. The only
evidence that can be marshalled in support of the trial court's finding on this point is the
erroneous testimony of Kelly Page. He testified that he hauled his ladder into the
Murray Autozone, took the old ballasts out of the lamps and inserted the new ballasts.
He did the same for the Orem store. According to Kelly Page, the charge of $338.47
per store was for labor performed in replacing the ballasts. Kelly Page's testimony is
inconsistent with that of his brother, Kevin Page.
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The figure $338.4? first surfaced in Glendon's memorandum to Page Electric of
January Id I!" ""Mil
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charge for replacement of the damaged or defective lighting ballasts. 1 LC sen: a cneck
for $33 Il 5 : i it h i: n lai ;; 29, 1991 tc ew • ei Page's postage costs.
Page Electric did not provide written notice to Glendon of the $338.47 change
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tune. Kevin P.settlement.

«-:endea a meeting ,\:;:_ representatives o: Glencie: w discuss
- meeting, Licwcon s representatives presented a document showing

various negative change orders including the two $338.47 charges. Glendon wanted to
"pass on" these charges to Page Electric k>r ;^<u*re to return the damaged or defective
ballasts. Kevin Page presented evidence that the ballasts had been returned. (DEx. 20).
He then recorded a positive change order of $338.47 on the Murray and Orem. Autozones

appeal occurred when Glendon's negative change orders were never incorporated into
Page Electric's July, 1991 billing statement or the figures used by the trial judge to
calculate the total judgment. Instead, the two $338.47 charges were mistakenly identified
on the billing statement as installation costs.
$338.47 was not a reasonable charge for replacing five (DEx. 20) defective or
damaged ballasts. The fact that the amount charged to replace the ballasts is identical
to the cost of the ballasts suggests a mistake was made. TEC supplied the lights and
shipped directly to Page Electric. TEC paid for the shipping costs to return the defective
or damaged ballasts. Page Electric should have also looked to TEC for reimbursement
of any installation costs.
See VI. C , supra, for Appellant's argument that the judgment should have been
reduced by the amount of damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CLOSING ARGUMENT
AND ORAL ARGUMENT ON OHIO CASUALTY'S POST-TRIAL
MOTION

In DeJohn v. American Estate Life Insurance Company. 489 P.2d 1065 (Colo.
App. 1971), the appellant/defendant asserted error by the trial court in refusing to permit
closing argument. Appellant contended that its legal argument might have swayed the
court's opinion. The Colorado Court of Appeals held against the appellant on this issue
because:
Defendant was not denied the right to give the trial
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court the benefit of its thinking on the legal theories
involved since such arguments were properly presented in
the motion for new trial and were rejected by the trial court,
Id. at i w < .
In the instant case, the trial court not only prohibited closing argument but also
disregarded, without explanation, Ohio Casualty's request for oiai

-Lament on its

Motion to Amend Findings and Judgment or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. Utah
Code of Ji idi :ial \ di i lii listratioi i Ri lie 4 501(3)(b). (c) & (d) states:
(b)

In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action
on the merits with prejudice, either party at the
time of filing the principal memorandum in support
of or in opposition to a motion may file a written
request for a hearing.

(c)

Such request shall be grantcu urn. - inc eoui; finds
that (a) the motion or opposition \o the motion is
frivolous or lb) thai the dispositiu- issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion
has been ai ith> r * •
i'v..ui.

(d)

When a request tor hearing is denied, the court
shall notify the requesting party....

(Emphasis added).

If granted, Ohio Casualty's motioii to amend the findings and

judgment would have disposed of the case on the merits with prejudice. Yet, the court
failed to grai it tl ic reqi lest foi oral ai gi m :i itei it. failed to i i la ke findings that the motion was
frivolous or the issues authoritatively decided, and failed to notify Ohio Casualty.

The need for oral argument was underscored by the trial court's non-responsive
ruling of January 18, 1993 (R. 101-102). Insufficiency of the evidence was only one of
several issues raised in Ohio Casualty's post-trial motion and memorandum. The trial
court failed to consider or ignored the other issues. Ohio Casualty never raised an issue
about the adequacy of time to present its case. The trial court's ruling on this point was
completely irrelevant to the issues raised in Ohio Casualty's post-trial motion and
memorandum.

vn.
CONCLUSION
Ohio Casualty respectfully requests this Court to reverse the judgment and remand
the case to the trial court with instructions to amend its findings and judgment as follows:
a)

Eliminate the award of prejudgment interest;

b)

Reduce the judgment by $1,263.16, the amount of liquidated and additional

damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric; and
c)

Delete the awards of $338.47 per building on the Murray and Orem

Autozones for replacing damaged or defective lighting.
In the alternative, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests the court to reverse and
remand for a new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence to support the amount of
judgment and/or error in law. The Court should instruct the trial court to allow oral
argument if properly requested.
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Dated this

day of August, 1993.

Ronald E. Griffin
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on August
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010

\
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, 1993, to:

ADDENDUM INDEX

A.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953).

B.

Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)(b), (c) & (d).

C.

Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989).

D.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated August 5, 1992.

E.

Defendant's Exhibit 21, Subcontractor Prequalification Form.

F.

Defendant's Exhibit 11, Subcontract Agreement.

G.

Defendant's Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, Change Authorization and Change Order
Summary showing Autozone's assessment of Liquidated damages to Glendon and
Summary of Glendon's assessment of damages to subcontractors.

H.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, Steve Lefler's memorandum of January 16, 1991
and Jeanene Page's response of January 23, 1991.

I.

Judge Page's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Amend Findings and
Judgement, or in the Alternative, For a New Trial dated January 18,

34

1993.

ADDENDUM "A"

78-27-3. Objection to tender — Must be specified
deemed waived.

or

The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed to
have waived it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of
the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objection
afterwards.

ADDENDUM "B"

(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues m the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or m opposition
to a motion may file a wntten request for a hearing
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time

ADDENDUM "C

14-2-1. Definitions — P a y m e n t bond required — Right of
action — Notice — Attorneys' fees.
(1) For purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be awarded a contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure,
or improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner'' means any person contracting for construction, alteration,
or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land.
(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with Subsection (3). The bond shall become binding
upon the award of the contract to the contractor.
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the
owner for the protection of all persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum
equal to the contract price.
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this
chapter for any unpaid amount due him if:
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract for which the payment
bond is furnished under this chapter; and
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days after the last day on
which he performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment or
material for which the claim is made.
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county where the contract was to be performed and not
elsewhere. The action is barred if not commenced wTithin one year after the
last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the
equipment or material on which the claim is based. The obligee named in the
bond need not be joined as a party to the action. In any action upon a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, which fees
shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested person upon
request.
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this chapter, the court shall
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.,
a corporation,

)
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 910750974 CV

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP OF
INSURANCE COMPANIES, a corporation,
Judge Page
Defendant.
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before
the above entitled Court, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District
Judge, presiding

on Monday, June 8th, 1992 and continued on

Wednesday, June 10th, 1992. The plaintiffs appeared by Kevin Page,
Kay Page and Kelley Page, together with their attorney, George K.
Fadel.

The defendant appeared by Attorney Ronald E. Griffin. The

Court heard testimony and considered all evidence, and being fully
advised in the matter, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a corporation of the State of Utah with its

principal place of business at 353 North Main Street, North Salt
Lake, Utah.

2
2.

Defendant is a corporation doing business as an insurance

and bonding company in the State of Utah with an office at 7050
Union Park Avenue, Suite 350, Midvale, Utah.
3.

The Glendon

Corporation

which

acted

as

a general

contractor for construction of buildings for AUTOZONE, INC. has its
principal office at 450 East 1000 North, North Salt Lake, Utah, and
contracted to construct buildings for Autozone in Davis County,
Salt Lake County and Utah County, State of Utah.
4. Glendon Corporation contracted in Davis County, Utah with
plaintiff to provide certain labor and materials for electrical
facilities in the buildings in each of said three counties.
5.

In each of the buildings in said three counties, Autozone

as owner contracted with Glendon for construction thereof for
amounts exceeding $2,000.00 and the owner, Autozone, obtained from
the contractor, Glendon, a payment bond for the protection of all
persons supplying labor, services equipment or material in the
prosecution of the work provided in the contracts equal to the
contract price.
6.

The defendant contracted as surety and provided the

payment bond pursuant to the requirements of 14-2-1 Utah Code
Annotated.
7.

In reliance upon the contract of Glendon and the payment

bond of the defendant, the plaintiff supplied labor and materials
in the construction of the buildings

in each of said three

counties.
8. Glendon built basically two sizes of stores for Autozone,
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a smaller store which was typical of the store built in Bountiful,
Utah, and a larger store which was typical of the stores built in
Orem and Murray, Utah.

Glendon requested plaintiffs to bid the

electrical labor and materials other than equipment and fixtures
for the three jobs.
companies

which

The plaintiff and defendant were neighboring

had

both

conducted

business

in

the

area.

Plaintiffs had available to them the site plans and specifications
at Glendon's plan room for the jobs in question.

Plaintiff's

representative

office and

looked

at the

plans

at

Glendon's

submitted bids from said plans for the Bountiful, Murray and Orem
stores.

The bid documents consists of the actual plans, the site

plans and any addendums which are a part of those plans, and the
bids of the plaintiff are governed by those bid documents.

The

plaintiff's bids for the stores were $7,190.00 as a basic bid for
the Bountiful store, and $9,420.00 was the basic bid tor each of
the Murray and Orem stores.

Glendon received the said bids and

responded that the plaintiff company had been the low bidders.
Subsequently, a review of the jobs was conducted by Glendon at a
meeting at which plaintiff's representative was present with other
subcontractors and a discussion followed relating to bid documents
and somewhat the procedures to be followed in connection with the
change orders.

All parties contemplated that there would be some

change orders during the course of construction.
9.
stores

Glendon commenced construction on the three Autozone
for which

they were successful

bidder.

Wherein the

plaintiff supplied the first labor and materials on the Bountiful

4
store on August 30, 1990, and the last work on October 29, 1990.
The first work on the Murray store was September 5, 1990, and the
last work thereon was December 4, 1990,

It was the agreement of

the parties that progress payments would be made as those payments
were received by the Glendon Corporation.

The three jobs were

substantially completed by the early part of December, although the
Bountiful store was substantially completed by October 29th so far
as the plaintiff was concerned.
10.

During the course of construction, certain changes were

made although neither Glendon nor the plaintiff followed the
procedures set forth in the proposed construction contained in the
subcontract or the prime contract.
certain

change

orders

although

not

The parties have admitted
accomplished

by

contract

documents. There was never any written agreement between plaintiff
and Glendon Corporation.

However, it is clear that these parties

had a meeting of the minds at least as to the basic contract price
and what was to be paid in that regard and they further agreed that
there would be changes and that those changes would be expected to
be carried out by the plaintiff although it is not clear what the
agreement was between the parties on how the change orders were to
be conducted.

There is no question that there was never any

written direction by Glendon to plaintiff to complete any change
order nor that plaintiff ever submitted a written request on a
change order.

At least two change orders were admitted by the

parties, being the change in the parking lot lighting at the Murray
store and the addition of the roof top units at the Murray and Orem

5
stores.

Many items sought by plaintiff as change orders were in

fact part of the contract documents and somehow overlooked by
plaintiff.

The heat tapes were to have been included by the

contract documents.

On the Murray store the parking lot lighting

was contemplated by all parties as an addition and the reasonable
value thereof is $1,380.00 however a reduction of $316.00 is
allowed thereon because plaintiff did not complete the addition.
The extra roof top unit, and the rerouting of the power to the sign
as a result of placing of the curbing by the contractor was also
properly charged as extras approved by Glendon if not the parent
company, Autozone.

Under the contract documents Autozone was to

furnish certain fixtures including lighting fixtures and the extra
charge in replacing the defective fixtures is a proper additional
charge for the Murray store of $338.00.

Glendon was required to

expend $143.00 for an improperly installed light and $891.30 for
the heating tape.
Regarding the Orem store, the charges of the plaintiff of
$670.00 for the extra roof top unit, and repairs to the defective
lighting charged at $338.47 are proper extra charges, subject to
a deduction of $891.30 for the heat tape.
A summary of charges and credits on the three stores is as
follows:

Bountiful Store:
Reasonable Value of performance of bid
Less heat tape.
Net

$7,190.00
-891.30
$6,298.70

6
Murray Store:
Reasonable value of performance of bid
Power to yard lights $1,380.00 less $316.00
Extra roof top unit
Rerouting conduit to sign
Repairs to defective lighting

$9,420,00
1,064.00
670.00
153.00
338.47
$11,645.47

Less credit to Glendon:
Heating tape $891.30
Improper light installation $143.00
Temporary hookup $297.00
Deduction
Net
Orem Store:
Reasonable value of performance of bid
Extra roof top unit
Repairs to defective lighting

$1,331.30
$10,314.17
$9,420.00
670.00
338.47
$10,428.47

Less credit to Glendon:
Heating tape $891.30
Uncompleted work $215.00
Net
Total amount due Plaintiff:
11.

-1,106.30
$9,322.17

$25,935.04

The plaintiff has not been paid any amount other than

reimbursement for the temporary power. The part payment by checks
reciting payment in full were properly refused by the plaintiff,
and the lien waivers were without consideration and of no effect.
12.

The Court finds that the defendant surety agreed to

indemnify and pay over on behalf of Glendon any sums due and owing
pursuant to the contracts which were not paid by Glendon but not
exceeding the contract amounts. The Court finds that the additions
agreed to by the parties are included as contracted amounts.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the

7
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff

is entitled

to

judgment against the

defendant for the sum of $25,935.04 together with prejudgment
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from January
23, 1991.

2.

Plaintiff

is entitled to judgment for a reasonable

attorney's fee as set forth in the revised affidavit of plaintiff's
attorney in the sura of $4,140.00.
3.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for costs.

Dated this

5^

day of August, 1992.
BY THE COURT

TRUDGE
DISTRICT
JUDGE
Approved As To Form:
Ronald E. Gr:u£fin

r

'
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ADDENDUM "E"

GLEND0N CORPORATION
GENERAL CONTRACTORS
450 EAST 1000 NORTH
THIRD FLOOR
NORTH SALT LAKE, UT
84054

VENDOR ft

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i * * * * . ^

SUBCONTRACTOR PRE-QUAL1FICATI0N FORM
******************************************** *** ****** *******;* *** * «*;+ ** **********
AIA DIVISION tt: in
RESIDENTIAL:
COMMERCIAL:
COMPANY NAMEn
r_
ADDRESS:

TYPE OF WORK:

( Y g S ^ NO
rttiS)/
NO
PAGE

1PrMrai

mni-rart-nr

selective/

ELECTRIC

SERVICE, INC.

353 North Main

CITY: Nnrrh Salt Xake
OFFICE PHONE:

P

STATE

292-2071

SALESMAN NAME: N/A

Litah

Z1P CODE:_MQ5.^

HOME PHONE:

reps, will he Merlin, Kevin or

STATE OF UTAH LICENSE NUMBER:

1 5S04-S

CITY OR COUNTY LICENSE NUMBER:

n ^

?Q?-iQ8S
KPII

y PagP
.

st-at-p r P f P rpnr P n'iph°r

CORPORATION: (YES// NO
PARTNERSHIP: YES / NO
PROPRIETORSHIP:
(Please list individuals of either type below)
Jeanene S. Page, Pres.

YES / NO

Merlin W. Page, V.P. Kelly D. Page, V.P.

James Kevin Page, Sec/Treasurer
FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NO. 87-O^nSfiSn
OR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
other policies are cover through Full Service Agency of S.L. C.
LIABILITY CARRIER:
gfat.p T n g l , r g n r g F n n H
POLICY tf: P ? ? 9 7
ADDRESS:
DATE ISSUED:

CITY:
Aug. 1 970 approx.

STATE:

ZIP:

EXPIRATION DATE: nnn P

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

JOB REFERENCES:
COMPANY NAME
tfl

pH0Hg

Raymond C o n s t . 7 5 2 - 2 9 1 1

n

KHAL B i d s .

13

Pepsi-Cola

C0HTACT

W0RK

Dave W a t t s
S t e v e or R o g e r

972-2732

Ed H u t t o

DONE

BAVC/Logan
Taco Bell
Pepsi

SUBCONTRACTOR HEARBY AGREES TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
1. PREPARATION OF BIDS: (a) Failure to examine any drawings, specifications and instructions will
be at bidder's risk.
(b) All prices and notations must be printed in ink or typewritten. No erasures permitted. Errors
Bay be crossed out and corrections printed in ink or typewritten adjacent and must be initialed in
ink by person signing bid.
(c) Price each item separately. Unit price shall be shown and a total price shall be entered for
each item bid on.
(d) Brand names and numbers when given are for reference.
(e) Tine of delivery is part of the bid and must be adhered to.
2. SUBMISSION OF BID: (a) Bids must be signed in ink and bidders ' name on outside of envelope.
(b) Bids and modifications or corrections thereof received after the closing time specified will not
be considered.
(c) No charge for delivery, drayage, express, parcel post, packing, cartage, insurance license fees,
permits, cost of bonds, or for any other purpose will be paid by Glendon Corporation unless expressly
included and itemized in the bid.
3. BONDS: Glendon Corporation reserves the right to require from the vendor a bid bond, a supply
contract bond, a performance bond and a payment bond in an amount or amounts meeting the legal
requirements thereof.
L
AJfARD OF CONTRACT: (a) Contracts and purchases will be made or entered into with the
responsible bidder making the lowest and or best bid meeting specifications subject to Glendon
Corporations right of rejection of any or all bids.
(b) Unless the bidder has specified otherwise in this bid Glendon Homes Construction may accept any
item or group of items of any kind.
(c) Glendon Corporation reserves the right to reject any or all bids and waive any informality or
technicality in bids received in the interest of Glendon Corporation.
(d) The acceptance by Glendon Corporation for this quotation shall create a binding and enforceable
Contract of Sale, dating from the time of said acceptance, without any further action by either party
and even though a written purchase order has not been furnished to or received by the successful
bidder. Said created Contract of Sale shall include all of the provisions and specifications of the
request for quotation, offer, acceptance and purchase order relating thereto. Said contract shall be
interpreted, construed and given effect in all respects according to the laws of the State of Utah
and the Ordinances of local building authority and shall not be assignable by the vendor in whole or
in part without the written consent of Glendon Corporation.
5. SAMPLES:
Samples of items, when required, must be furnished free of expense to Glendon
Corporation and if not destroyed by test, may upon request made at the time the sample is furnished,
be returned at the bidders expense.
6. FAILURE TO BID: Failure to bid or to advise Glendon Corporation that future requests for
quotations are desired may result in the removal of the vendor's name from the bidder's list.

7
WARRANTY The bidder expressly warrants that the merchandise will conform to its description
and any applicable specifications, shall be of good mercnantabl* quality and fit for the known
purpose for which it is sold
This warranty is m addition to a*y standard wi^ranty or service
guarantee given by the bidder to a purchaser
8
CONDITION
Checks will not be released unless proof of acti/e memoership in Worker s
Compensation Fund of Utah and Liability Insurance, in the torm of a Certificate of Insurance is m
our files, also, to be included is a W-9 Form If t m s msuiance is allowed to lapse, checks will b^
held until confirmation of reinstatement is received by our office

MHcte**
Due to regulations made bv Workers Compensation of Utah, we are no longer able to reauest
veritication to current payments made to Workers Compensation This verification must now cose from
the suocontractor personally
We need to receive this information within 10 days following your receipt ot this torm
It we have
not received verification m the above stated time, we will assume the^e is no coverage and will
deduct the appropriate amount from any pa/cents to be made to you and will credit them to Workers
Compensation
To request the certificate of verification, call 533-8020 and give them your Policy Number You can
have them send it directly to us at Glendon Corporation - 450 East 1000 Nor+h Suite 201, North Salt
Lake, Utah 84054
We appreciate you help m this matter

Aataorized signature

ADDENDUM "F'

SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
THIS A G R E E M E N T made at

SALT LAKE CITY

JUNE

, 19

90

t

U u h )

20TH

day of

GLENDON CORPORATION

L

, by and b e t w e e n

of

t h u

, hereinafter referred to as the Contractor, and
VIC?. EI.PfTOTP

CONTRACT* 90Q8-160Q0S
hereinafter referred to as the Subcontractor We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns
jointly and severally firmly by these presents
WITNESSETH
agree as follows

1.

That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor

SCOPE OF WORK
That the work to be performed by the Subcontractor under the terms of this agreement consist* of the following-

Furnishing of all labor and material, tools, implements, and equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, etc., to do all of the
following

FURNISH AMD INSTALL
(ELECTRICAL)
AS PEE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING
SECTIONS IN THE DRAWINGS: (A0.1 - A0.6) (A.1A - A.1D) ( A . l - A.8) ( S . l - S.5) (HP.l - HP.6) ( E . l - K.6) ( P . l P.4) (SN.l - SH.2) IT IS THE INTENT OF THIS CONTRACT TO COVER ALL OF (YOUR) WORK TEAT IS IN THE ABOVE SECTIONS.
ALL WORK IS TO BE COMPLETED AS DIRECTED BY AND ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR. TIME IS OF
THE ESSENCE. WE AS CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTORS MUST ADHERETOTHE JOB SCHEDULE THAT WILL BECOME ATTACHMENT
H n
B OF THIS CONTRACT.
ATTACHMENT "A" IS A PART OF THIS CONTRACT. A CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE WILL BE IN OUR CORPORATE OFFICE AND ALSO IN
OUR JOB TRAILER ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE. IT WILL BECOME ATTACHMENT "B" OF THIS CONTRACT.
When the Subcontractor does not install all material furnished under this Subcontract such material as is not installed

JOBSITE

is to be delivered F O B

,

,

u
J
in strict accordance withL the
plans and specifications as prepared
by

t
Architect and/or Engineer, for the construction of

For

AUTOZONE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION
AUTOZONE BOUNTIFUL

AUTOZONE

Owner.
for which construction the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner, together with all addenda or authonzed
changes issued prior to the date of execution of this agreement
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construct on
regulations, general conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract documents, if any there be, insofar
as applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described to be performed by the Subcon

tractor

t

ADDENDUMS | 1 AND I 2

In the event of any doubt or question arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans
and specifications the decision of the Architect and/or Engineer shall be conclusive and binding Should there be no supervising architect over the work, then the matter in question shall be determined as provided in Section 7 of the agreement

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

Co

r n u o c v ^ u u u i M u r wwv^nrv, U C L M T O ,

tiw.

The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work undertaken in a prompt and diligent manner whenever such
part of it, becomes available, or at such other time or times as the Contractor may direct, and so as to promot ^ ^ ^ ^ W
progress of the entire construction, and shall not, by delay or otherwise, interfere with or hinder the work of the C ***$$l
or any other Subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails to supply the nee ° a t r * * ^
and/or materials, tools, implements, equipment, etc., in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall ^ i 4 ^ r
Subcontractor in writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of ^uch written n r' ^ ****
Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the S ^ ' ****
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor ma C°1?
over such portion of the Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the Contracto
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might' I ^
to pursue, the Subcontractor agrees to release to the Contractor, for his use only, without recourse, any materials to
implements, equipment, etc., on the site, belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the C
tractor, in completing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best
his ability and in the most economical manner available to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in dom
any such portion of the work covered by this agreement shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under th
terms of this agreement, and in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall b
insufficient to cover the costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties i
any, shall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference.
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partiall
upon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcot
tractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same i
writing to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reasoi
able time in which to remedy such defects; and in the event he does not so report to the Contractor in writing, then it sha
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully respo
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work c
others.
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris r
suiting from his work. Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further payment to Subcontractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall clean up to the
satisfaction of the inspectors, all dirt, grease marks, etc., from walls, ceilings, floors, fixtures, etc., deposited or placed thereon
as a result of the execution of this subcontract. If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by
the Contractor, the Contractor shall have the right and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will
on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover supervision, insurance, overhead, etc.
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor
from his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract.
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or
use any portion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of
said work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which
may occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however, the Subcontractor
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor,
nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such period of use.
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance of
the Contract by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for
all materials and labor furnished to the project. In the event of loss or damage, he shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at his own expense, as directed by the Contractor/Subcontractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor's work,
property or materials.
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying
whenever a petition in Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him.
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes
toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save them harmless from,
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions
or covenants of this contract.
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all regulations
issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless
from any claims or charges of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply with the act and regulations and
agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or expenses of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of
the subcontractor's failure to comply.

Ol trie WOTK. t u v e r e u uy wns, d ^ r e e m e n t

me

u u n u is .u u»r « M . I . C i uv J 3u k c-,y v.vjiupu*i* u c a i g u d i e u u r a p p r o v e d o> .n»; v . u u

tractor, and in a form entirely satisfactory to the Contractor

4.

PERMITS, LICENSES, FEES, TAXES, ETC.

The Subcontractor shall, at his own cost and expense JODK '"or and obtain all necessary permits and licensps and -.hall
conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force in the local'ty <vhere the work under the project is being done, insofar
as applicable to work covered by this agreement The Subcontractor aha'l hold harmless the prime Contractor against haoility
by reason of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal 3 tate courty or mun cipal taxes

5.

INSURANCE

The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain .vor^mena compensation insurance and to comply in all respect
with the employment and payment of labor required b> an> constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in
which the work is performed.
The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and property damage insurance, and such other
insurance as the Contractor might deem necessary in amounts as approved by the Contractor, in order to protect the Contractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees Such
insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required in the general contract documents.
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor s expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be
notified by ten (10) days' written notice before cancellation of any such policy In event of threatened cancellation for nonpayment of premium, Contractor may pay same 'or Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts tnen or subsequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder

6.

CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

The Contractor may add to or deduct f«-om the amount oi *vork covered by this agreement, and any changes made in
the amount of work involved, or any other parts ot this agreement, ->hall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shail be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor if such be possible, and if such mutual agreement 's not posa.ble then the value of the work shall be determined as
provided in Section 7 of this agreement In either event however the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not fj delay the progress of the work, and pending any determi
nation of the value thereof
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional worK outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof
shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one
week from date of completion
The Subcontractor shall not sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any funds due or to become due or any part
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor.

7.

DISPUTES

In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute concerning matters in connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall be settled by
a ruling of a board of arbitration consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and
the third member shall be selected by the first two members The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the
arbitration in writing
The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings of any such board* of arbitration, finally and
without recourse to any court of law.

e t

SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINTY DOLLAR-

i m 01

—

in m o n t h l y p a y m e n t s of

£0

% of the w o r k

—
p e r f o r m e d in

any

0^|i

e

/4jMffPAfh

prepared by the S u b c o n t r a c t o r and as a p p r o v e d by t h e C o n t r a c t o r and .
., such p a y m e n t s to be m a d e as p a y m e n t s are received by the C o n t r a c t o r from t h e Q ^
covering the m o n t h l y estimates of the C o n t r a c t o r , including : h e a p p r o v e d p o r t i o n of the S u b c o n t r a c t o r 5 m o n t h l y •?«•>,
es*i ***
. e '«*rnat^'
In the event the S u b c o n t r a c t o r d o e s n o t s u b m i t to the C o n t r a c t o r such monthly estimates prior to the date of auh
sion of t h e C o n t r a c t o r ' s m o n t h l y e s t i m a t e , t h e n the C o n t r a c t o r -hail nclude in hu> m o n t h U e^t m a t e :o the O w n e r for w \
p e r f o r m e d during the preceding m o n t h such a m o u n t a a he shall d e e m p r o p e r for the w o r * j t *he S u b c o n t r a c t o r **or 'he o
ceding m o n t h and the S u b c o n t r a c t o r agrees to a c c e p t such a p p r o v e d p o r t i o n thereof Jo nis regular m o n t h l y p a y m e n t
described above
T h e S u b c o n t r a c t o r agrees to m a n e good w i t h o u t cost 10 the Owner o>* C o n t r a c t o r any and all defects d u e to 'auitv
w o r k m a n s h i p and or materials w m c h m a y a p p e a r within the o e ' i o d ^o established in tne contract d o c u m e n t * , and if no sucn
period be stipulated in the c o n t r a c t d o c u m e n t s , t h e n such g u a r a n t e e snail De tor a period of one year trom date of completion
of the project The S u b c o n t r a c t o r further agree* to e x e c u t e any special guarantees as provided by terms of t h e Contract
d o c u m e n t s , prior to final p a y m e n t
In the event it appears t o the C o n t r a c t o r that the ' a b o r , material and other bills ncurred in the p e r f o r m a n c e of the
work are n o t being currently paid, t h e C o n t r a c t o r mav take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the
m o n e y paid w i t h any progress p a y m e n t will be utilized to the full e x t e n t necessary to pay labor, material and all other bill*
incurred in the p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e work of S u b c o n t r a c t o r T h e C o n t r a c t o r m a y d e d u c t from any a m o u n t s due or to become
due to t h e S u b c o n t r a c t o r any s u m or s u m s owing by the S u b c o n t r a c t o r to t h e C o n t r a c t o r , and in the event of any breach by
the S u b c o n t r a c t o r of any provision or obligation of this S u b c o n t r a c t , or in t h e event of the assertion by other parties of any
claim or lien against t h e C o n t r a c t o r or C o n t r a c t o r s S u r e t y or the premises arising o u t of the S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e of
this C o n t r a c t , the C o n t r a c t o r shall have the right, b u t is n o t required, to retain o u t of any p a y m e n t s d u e or to b e c o m e due to
the S u b c o n t r a c t o r an a m o u n t sufficient to c o m p l e t e l y p r o t e c t the C o n t r a c t o r from any and all loss, damage or e x p e n s e therefrom, until the situation has been r e m e d i e d or adjusted by t h e S u b c o n t r a c t o r to the satisfaction of the C o n t r a c t o r These
provisions shall be applicable even t h o u g h the s u b c o n t r a c t o r has posted a full p a y m e n t and p e r f o r m a n c e b o n d .

9.

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT

In the event the prime c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n the O w n e r and the C o n t r a c t o r should be t e r m i n a t e d prior to its c o m p l e t i o n ,
then t h e C o n t r a c t o r and S u b c o n t r a c t o r agree that an e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t for work p e r f o r m e d u n d e r this a g r e e m e n t prior t o
such t e r m i n a t i o n , will be m a d e as provided by the c o n t r a c t d o c u m e n t s , if such provision be m a d e , or, if n o n e such exist, n e x t
by m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t , or, failing either of these m e t h o d s , by a r b i t r a t i o n as provided in Section 7.

10.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

During t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of this s u b c o n t r a c t , t h e S u b c o n t r a c t o r agrees to not discriminate against any e m p l o y e e because
of race, color, creed or national origin As o u t l i n e d n the E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t y Clause of the Regulations of E x e c u t i v e Order
1 0 9 2 5 of March 6, 1961 as a m e n d e d by E x e c u t i v e O r d e r 1 1 2 4 6 of S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 1965 T h e executive orders and the respective regulations are m a d e a part of this s u b c o n t r a c t by reference

11.

TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS

It is hereby u n d e r s t o o d and agreed t h a t for t h e work covered by this s u b c o n t r a c t , the S u b c o n t r a c t o r is b o u n d a n d
will c o m p l y with t h e terms a n d c o n d i t i o n s of t h e labor a g r e e m e n t s to which the general c o n t r a c t o r is a p a r t y , insofar as said
labor a g r e e m e n t s lawfully require s u b c o n t r a c t o r s to be so b o u n d .
IN WITNESS W H E R E O F , the C o n t r a c t o r and S u b c o n t r a c t o r signify their understanding and agreement w i t h the terms
hereof by affixing their signatures h e r e u n t o .
WITNESS.

450 EAST 1000 NORTH

GLEND0N CORPORATION
(C jruractor)

NORTH SALT LAKE, DTAH
(Address)

By.

PAGE ELECTRIC

353 NORTH MAIN

(Subcontractor)

NORTH SALT LAKE UTAH 84054
(Address)

By

ATTACHMENT A
1.

SUBCONTRACTOR specifically acknowledges its duties and
responsibilities to perform work in accordance with the
contract documents and to comply with all requirements
contained therein.

2.

REQUIRED INSURANCE:
a)

The subcontractor shall procure and maintain during the
entire period of performance under this contract the
following minimum insurance coverage;

1.
2.

Comprehensive General Liability; $500,000 per occurrence.
Automobile Liability; $200,000 per person, $500,000 per
occurrence, $20,000 per occurrence for property damage.
Worker's Compensation: As required by Federal and State
Workers' Compensation and occupational disease statutes.
Employer's Liability Coverage: $100,000*
Other as required by State Law.

3«
4.
5.

3.

b)

Prior to commencement of work, the Subcontractor shall
furnish copies of the Certificate of Insurance to the
Contractor for the above required insurance reflecting
Glendon Corporation as a certificate holder and
additional insured with a 30 day cancellation clause.
The policies evidencing required insurance shall contain
an endorsement to the effect that cancellation of any
material change in the policies adversely effecting the
interests of Glendon Corporation in such insurance shall
not be effective for such period as may be prescribed by
the laws of the State in which this contract is to be
performed and in no event less that Thirty (30) days
after written notice to the Contractor.

c)

Both insurance certificates referenced above must be
forwarded with original signatures. The Owner will not
accept copies.

d)

The Subcontractor agrees to insert the substance of this
clause, including this paragraph (c), in all subcontracts
hereunder.

PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION:
a)

Do not publicly release information, photographs,, or
other documents concerning any aspect of the materials
or services relating to this bid, contract or purchase
order without the prior written approval of Glendon
Corporation.

SUBCONTRACTOR agrees to provide and certify complete and
acceptable submittals within 10 days of this agreement or bear
all responsibilities and costs for any delays and resubraittals
associated with failure to comply with this requirement.
The following information is required to be shown on every
subcontract and pay request submitted regarding work in this
project:
a)

Subcontract number.

Assigned by Glendon Corporation*

b)

Required delivery date or date work is to commence.

c)

Authorized signature.

Glendon Corporation is an Equal Employment Opportunity firm.
There will be no discrimination upon a person's race,
religion, sex, color, national origin, handicap or veteran
status.

ADDENDUM "G*

CONSTRUCTION CHANGE
AUTHORIZATION

At A DOCUMENT C713 (Instructions on reverse side)

PROJECT:
(name, address)

AKRONS
/\/[u£Any,
UTAU
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DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT

a
a
a
a
a

Jj—r-

CONSTRUCTION CHANCE
AUTHORIZATION NO:
DATE OF ISSUANCE:

OWNER:
TO:
(Contractor)

Owner
Architect
Consultant
Contractor
Field
Other
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CONTRACT FOR:
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In order to expedite the Work and avoid or minimize delays in the Work which may affect Contract Sum
or Contract Time, the Contract Documents are hereby amended as described below. Proceed with this
Work promptly. Submit final costs for Work involved and change in Contract Time (if any), for inclusion
in a subsequent Change Order.
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Distribution
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VIA

;0M (CONTRACTOR): GLENDON CORP.
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HURRAY AUTOZONE

SUMMARY OF LIQUIDATED DAHAGES AS PER CONTRACT

SUB conr
CONTRACT ACTUAL
DAYS
DAYS

PHASE

SUB-CONTRACTOR

EXCAVATION
ASPHALT PAVING
FLAT CONCRETE LABOR
FOUNDATION LABOR
HASONARY
STEEL ERECTION
INSULATION
ROOFING
SlOU FRONT GLASS
DRYWALL & FRAHiHG
FLOOR TILE
S1UCCO (SYSIHETIC)
PANITING
PLUHBII.'G
H'.AC
ELECTRICAL

REYNOLDS BROS
SAVAGE PAVING
RAY WILLETTE
RUSS BAWDEN
BLAKE BOWTHORPE
CCC L T
HANSON
UTAH TILE
B h D GLASS
WALLDOARD SPECI.
J & S ENTERPRICES
WEBOR BRO.
UNIVERSAL WALL COVER
DUNCAN HECH.
AHS INC.
PAGE ELECTRIC

7
3
5
3
8
5
3
4
2
9
3
5
10
7
4
9

15
4
13
4
8
5
3
8
6
25
6
15
36
9
4
21

EXCESS
DAYS

PERCENT
OVER

-8
-1
-8
-1
0
0
0
-4
-4
-16
-3
-10
-26
-2
0
-12

8.41
1.1?
8.4°<
1.1*
0.01
0.0?
0.01
4.2?
4.21
16.8?
3.21
10.5?
27.41
2.1?
0.01
12.6?

-95

JOB SUHHARY

DAYS

10TAL CONTRACT DAYS
ACTUAL COHPL. DAYS
SUB CONTR. DELAYS
DAMAGE TO G.C.

80
100
20
20

TOTAL

DAHAGES
PER DAY

$300.00
$200.00

10TAL
DAHAGES

$6000.00
$4000.00
$10000.00

COST OF
DAMAGES
$842.11
$105.26
$842.11
$105.26
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$421.05
$421.05
$1684.21
$315.79
$1052.63
$2736.84'
$210.53
$0.00
$1263.16
$0.00
$10000.00

ADDENDUM "H"

SPEED MEMO

450 East 1000 North, Third Floor • North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 • (801) 295-7700 FAX (801) 298-0895

TO:

MERLIN,

1-16-90

AUIOZONE IS CHARGING GLENDON CORP. $338.47 PER BUILDING ON
MURRAY AND OREM FOR EXTRA ELECTRICAL PARTS THAT WERE ORDERED FROM
TEC ELECTRIC TO REPLACE DAMAGED EQUIPMENT. THESE PARTS WERE ORDERED
BY PAGE ELECTRIC BUT NEVER RETURNED TO TEC ELECTRIC. IF THESE PARTS
ARE RETURNED TO TEC ELECTRIC WE CAN RECOVER THIS MONEY. OTHERWISE
WE WILL DEDUCT $338.47 FROM EACH CONTRACT FOR A TOTAL OF $676.94.
SINCERELY,
STEVE LEFLER VICE PRESIDENT
GLENDON CORPORATION.
RESPONSE:

1/23/91

THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN THE ABOVE MEMO WERE TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT WE HAD ALREADY
INSTALLED THAT PROVED TO BE FAULTY AND WE USED IT TO MAKE THE CORRECTIONS. THE
DAMAGED ITEMS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO TEC. THANKS FOR BRINGING THIS TO OUR
ATTENTION AS WE WERE NEVER PAID FOR HANDLING AND INSTALLATION
INVOICE FOR THIS
WORK IS ENCLOSED.
SINCERELY,
PUINTIFF'S EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT WOII
/</

JEANENE S. PAGE, PRESIDENT
PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
ENC:

INVOICE/COPY TO TEC

CASE NO.

OATCREC'D

/

/r

.
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ADDENDUM T
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K JO

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT dOURT

£ 33 f7 '(j-j

IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

V\ ^

PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Plaintiff,
vs .
THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS
AND JUDGMENT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL
Civil No. 910750974

Defendant.
Comes now the Court and having reviewed defendant's
motion to amend findings and judgment or in the alternative for
a new trial and the memorandum in support thereof and
plaintiff's memorandum in opposition thereto and the pleadings
in the file and the court's notes of the hearing herein, the
Court hereby denies defendant's motion.

The Court finding that

the Findings and Conclusions heretofore made by the Court are
adequately supported by the evidence and that counsel had
adequate time to present their respective cases during the
course of the trial.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Order in
accordance with the Court's ruling, submit the same to opposing
counsel at least five days prior to the time it is submitted to
the Court for signature.
Dated this

) g ^ day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

(yzU<^uu^f

^U) -

~t2> .

t-2
District—2ourt
Judge

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ruling, postage prepaid on the
/^^^day of
January, 1993, to the following:
George K. Fadel
170 West Fourth South
Bountiful, UT 84010
Ronald Griffin
The Valley Tower, Suite 900
50 West 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
BY THE CLERK

Deputy Clerk

